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Why Study Enclaves?

It has been stated innumerable times that Gibraltar would become Spanish again, “before 1800,” “after the war,” (with reference to several wars), “before 2000,” or simply “within 20 years time.” Time and dates pass but Gibraltar remains stubbornly British, recently celebrating its 300th anniversary as a British possession. A remarkable referendum was held there in 2002 when more than 99 percent of the population unambiguously expressed their wish to remain British. It was said a number of times that, comparable to Gibraltar’s case, Ceuta and Melilla ought to be Moroccan. Will they turn Moroccan one day? Ceuta and Melilla have remained Spanish beachheads since 1668, and Spain is ready to fight for them, as the events of 2002 showed when Spain sent its fleet to defend the tiny uninhabitable island of Perejil lying just 250 meters from the Moroccan coast, where Moroccan peasants let their goats graze. Russian politicians and analysts cry in despair that Kaliningrad may be lost, either to independence or to Germany. Yet the economic, political, social, and cultural ties with the mainland are strong, and there is no sign of separatism. On the other hand, Hong Kong and Macau were transferred to the People’s Republic of China in 1997 and 1999, respectively. So why is sovereignty over some enclaves transferred while other enclaves remain firmly attached to their mainlands?

An *enclave* is generally understood to be a part of the territory of a state that is enclosed within the territory of another state. One might say, taking a first look, that enclaves are “abnormal.” A region detached from the main body of the country? A region that one can reach only by crossing another state? A region with so many obvious inconveniences for governance and economic life? A region that explicitly counters the very idea of a contiguous nation-state? States, it would seem, should be happy to get rid of them

in any manner possible—exchange them, sell them, or simply give them up. Yet, this is all too often not the case. Many enclaves have proven to be extremely resilient, even in the face of war, changing borders, or differing economic systems. Moreover, one might assume that states would at least avoid creating new enclaves. Yet even this is not the case. Nations might not have liked it, but new enclaves and exclaves—including quite large ones—were mushrooming in the 1990s. The wave of break-ups of the socialist states, in particular of the Soviet Union, brought into existence more than twenty new enclaves in Europe and Asia.

Now, let us look at enclaves from an economic point of view. Being detached from its mainland, an enclave finds itself in a specific position as concerns its economic policy, economic specialization, and trade. In such conditions, some enclaves manage to prosper, though some start to decay. By the time of its handover to the PRC, Hong Kong had become a showcase of free trade and world globalization. Western European small enclaves, such as Belgian Baarle-Hertog, Spanish Llívia, Italian Campione, or Austrian Jungholz, as well as the U.S. enclave Point Roberts, prosper on tourism and cross-border shopping. On the other hand, almost 200 Indo-Bangladeshi Cooch Behar enclaves do not even have electricity and are stricken by poverty. The populous Fergana Valley enclaves, in possession of fertile lands and wonderful landscapes, are doing worse than their immediate neighbors. Somewhere in the middle, Spanish Ceuta and Melilla or Russian Kaliningrad struggle by with the help of federal subsidies and privileges. These and many other enclaves show a number of trends in common, both advantageous and disadvantageous. Yet, despite many similarities, some of them manage to do well while some do not.

This theory of enclaves and exclaves tries to answer the questions raised above as well as many others. Some of them are more practical. Consider Sokh, an Uzbek enclave in Kyrgyzstan, the home for some 40,000 people, at a distance of a mere five kilometers from Kyrgyzstan proper. In just a few years, the combined effect of the proactive enforcement of border controls, the laying of unmarked minefields, and the threat of a guerrilla invasion, has led to a sense of siege. What solutions are there to be employed to solve the problem of access from the mainland to the enclave? What can be done to ensure the peaceful existence of the enclave? These issues are of the utmost importance for enclaves, as well as having the ability to negatively affect bilateral relations between states. Such was the Kaliningrad transit issue, which Russia and the European Union were struggling with—with only limited success—in 2002–2004. Such issues are not easy to resolve. The issue of transit to Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani exclave with some 200,000 inhabitants, has not been resolved despite its importance for the well-being of the inhabitants. It took twenty years to implement an agreement on the so-called Tin Bigha corridor, a mere 178 meters in length, to connect the

largest Bangladeshi enclave in Cooch Behar, Dahagram-Angarpota, with Bangladesh proper. Dozens of people were killed in the meantime.

I came to the idea of a systematic study of enclaves and exclaves when I began researching the economic development of the Kaliningrad region. This was, and is, a complex issue comprising a number of intertwined economic and political problems, which cannot be separated from one another. It soon became obvious that there were other enclaves in the world. Were they perhaps comparable to Kaliningrad in some respect? Could Russia and its far western region avoid making mistakes that were made by others a long time ago? What economic models could be suitable for Kaliningrad? And what might be Kaliningrad's future? As I embarked on this enclave quest, I soon found out that there was an abundance of them, hundreds, in fact. The topic proved to be complex and underresearched in academic literature.

There are two major reasons to study enclaves: for the sake of the enclave dwellers themselves, and for the sake of relations between the mainland state and the surrounding state. To begin with, three million people live in enclaves throughout the world. They often experience severe problems exactly because of the enclavity of their native land. These problems range from political ones—the lack of governance and police protection—to economic problems caused by the inherent vulnerability of an enclave and its isolation from the mainland. Second, enclaves and exclaves should be studied in order to better understand the bilateral relations between the mainland state and the state that surrounds the enclave. Enclaves influence the bilateral relations between their mainlands and surrounding states in a disproportionate degree to the smallness of both their territory and population. The importance of enclaves in international relations is far beyond their relative weight in terms of population and land, and this importance is not restricted to the people who live in them but goes far beyond, influencing other political and economic issues between their respective mainlands and surrounding states. Enclaves have the ability to severely disrupt otherwise constructive and peaceful relations. These small splinters, lying deep in the flesh of the surrounding state, may become “a stone in one's shoe,” as Gibraltar became for Spain, or Ceuta and Melilla became for Morocco. The importance of Gibraltar (30,000 inhabitants, 6.5 km²) has been disproportionately large for British-Spanish relations throughout the last three centuries. Tiny Ceuta and Melilla (19.5 and 12.5 km², 72,000 and 62,000 inhabitants, respectively) have caused (and are causing) tensions in Spanish-Moroccan relations for more than three centuries. German Buesingen (1,500 inhabitants, 7.6 km²) was subject to several complex international treaties between Germany and Switzerland. Nor can one forget what is probably the most famous enclave of the twentieth century, West Berlin, having been an emblem of the conflict between East and West for four and

a half decades and one of the most vivid symbols of the Cold War. Even the tiny enclaves surrounding West Berlin (there were twelve of them) caused some tension, with, at one point, British soldiers on a troop carrier escorting a West German child on the way to school. The list could be much longer.

The first inclination of most governments would usually be to get rid of their enclaves somehow, for example, by way of an exchange of territories. This is, however, not always a feasible option. Large enclaves with significant populations are not ready candidates for an exchange. Even handling the smaller plots of land is not easy, in reality, since it can exacerbate questions of sovereignty and other related sentiments. Finally yet perhaps most importantly, enclaves are almost all inhabited. As enclave dwellers usually value their attachment to the mainland, it is difficult, in a democratic society, to ignore their wishes. Nevertheless, even if an exchange—or at least the building of a corridor—is not feasible, there are ways to deal with enclaves. Western European enclaves no longer create serious problems for either the mainland or the surrounding state. Although this was not the case in the past many crucial issues have been resolved over the course of the centuries. In today's peaceful and integrated Europe, enclaves prosper and—almost always—do not negatively affect relations between states. This is not the case in other areas and continents. The most instructive example is the comparison of the world's two most tangled enclave complexes. On the one hand, there is Baarle, with 22 Belgian and eight Dutch enclaves. Despite many serious problems, such as smuggling and border delimitation, having been overcome only recently (final border delimitation occurred only in 1995), the two nations in Baarle coexist very closely. They have even learned to use their complex border as a tourist attraction. The duplication of public services remains a problem even now to a certain extent; however the Baarle enclave dwellers have learned to deal with this in a constructive way. On the other hand, there is Cooch Behar, with its 106 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 92 Bangladeshi enclaves in India, home to some 60,000 people. The situation remains dreadful in these enclaves despite the fact that they have existed on an international level since 1947. No governance; no police protection; innumerable obstacles to normal economic and social life; no electricity (despite, in many cases, the power lines of the surrounding state going across this or that enclave); no public services; total economic underdevelopment; violence, defenselessness in combating gangs, and people being shot by border guards. Sections of the border have remained undemarcated for 60 years now. Between these two extreme cases of a positive and negative way of handling enclave issues, there lies a realm of international enclaves. Despite all the differences in their situation, there are, as I will show in this book, certain commonalities between them. They share not only many common problems but also some unusual opportu-

nities created by their very enclavity, by the fact that they are detached from their mainland state and embedded in another state. Enclaves can be either an opportunity or a curse for their inhabitants.

Enclaves are often viewed as the anomalous objects of world political geography, as something peculiar, a curiosity in the world of geography and international relations. Even the authors who write about individual enclaves often regard them as an exception to the norm. Peter Gold, the author of books on both Gibraltar and Spanish Ceuta and Melilla, calls the latter two “anomalous” as well as using the same term to characterize the situation of enclaves in general (Gold 2000, cover page, 150). Raton wrote in 1958, “international enclaves, the archaic remnants, are in the course of disappearance” (Raton 1958, 193). Almost fifty years later, we ascertain that he was wrong. In fact, the number of enclaves having come into existence in the second half of the twentieth century outweighs the number of those that have ceased to exist.

Considering the diversity of enclaves, is a theory of enclaves and exclaves possible in principle? Rudolf Scherrer, the author of a dissertation devoted to Buesingen, wrote the following:

Our overview demonstrates that the enclaves of the present time differ from each other significantly according to their size, total population and geographical location; their present political situations and their economic structures would prove completely different after a closer investigation. The geographical characteristic of being excluded and included however is common to all of them, so it is justified to raise the enclave question in the practice and literature of international law. If one considers the different layers of legal norms, then it is also possible to add that there are not only international law issues but also state and administrative problems that are connected to the existence of an enclave. (1973, 18–19)

Scherrer starts by stating a principal incomparability of enclaves because of the differences in size, population, geography, as well as political and economic structures. However, quite contrary to his starting point, he ends up with a remark on their commonality in the sphere of international, state, and administrative law. It seems peculiar that Scherrer finds common ground exactly in the field of his own scientific expertise. More recent authors tend to point at the substantial commonalities that exist. For instance, Nies indicates four common problem fields: first, access to an enclave; second, the problem of political management; third, economic development; and fourth, the incongruous identity of the mainland and its enclave (Nies 2003a; 2003b).

Personally, I perceive enclaves not as geographical curiosities but as an independent class of spatial-political objects. These territories share many

similar problems and opportunities. Enclaves are usually viewed from two angles. To begin with, one must take into account the administration problems, which may arise for the mainland state, when the enclave problem is considered from their point of view. Second, another facet of the issue can be distinctly seen from the viewpoint of the surrounding state. It is rare that an enclave is viewed from within, from the position of its inhabitants; however, this third perspective will receive full coverage in this book, along with the first two. Enclaves are not just mere inhabited areas of land, and consequently both the inhabitants and their opinions on enclave problems deserve close attention. It is highly likely that both the mainland and the surrounding country will experience a number of problems and inconveniences of a political, administrative, and economic nature owing to the existence of the enclave. At the same time, these are enclave dwellers whose lives are influenced profoundly by the fact that their city, town, or village is an enclave.

QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

A theory of enclaves and exclaves should be complex and comprehensive in order to answer a number of questions. It should strive to examine at least three facets of enclaves' existence, that is, their political, economic, and social life. The range of questions is large. The first layer consists of questions dealing with the very phenomenon of enclaves and exclaves. Are they specific indeed? Do they have any common characteristics so that they can be treated as a unique class of spatial objects? A number of questions concern enclaves' emergence, maturity, and disappearance.

Why and how do they emerge? How do they mature and build their internal politics and economics as well as their relations with the outside world, especially with their respective surrounding states and mainlands? A large part of the investigation concerns enclave economies. Here, we are dealing with a difficult challenge, which these territories have to overcome. Their existence under the specific conditions of heavy external dependency and insufficiency of internal resources calls for specific ways of arranging their economic specialization. The economic challenge of enclaves and exclaves differs from the economic challenges of small states and islands because of their very enclave/exclave status. Further to this, we will go on to the study of societies, raising demographical, sociological, and cultural questions.

This theory of enclaves makes an attempt to provide some tentative answers to policy-oriented questions. There are two principal ones. First, as enclaves are often objects of tension, how may one secure peace in and around them? Second, what are the general economic policies that can be

followed to provide successful economic development of enclave and exclave regions and states?

Following are the questions that should be asked in order to provide a theory of enclaves and exclaves:

- Nonsovereign enclaves as a unified class of spatial objects. Are there specific political and economic patterns conditioned by the notions of enclavity and exclavity? If yes, what are they?
- Enclaves' life cycle. How do enclaves emerge? How do enclaves mature? How do they cease to exist? Under what conditions do enclaves tend to exist for longer or shorter periods of time?
- Enclave economies. Are enclaves generally incapable of being economically sustainable on their own? What are the conditions for economic prosperity? What are the factors impeding development? What are the factors advancing development?
- Enclave societies. How do national, religious, and linguistic composition patterns contribute to the quality of relations with the surrounding state and the mainland state? Are there "enclave specifics" of self-identity?
- Policies and strategies for enclaves. First, as enclaves are often objects of tension, how does one secure peace in and around them? Second, what are the general strategies for the successful economic development of enclave and exclave regions and states?
- Enclaves in the world. What is the place of enclaves in the bilateral relations between the surrounding and the mainland state? What is the place of enclaves in world politics? What is the place of enclaves in the world economy?

Thus this theory has two components. First, it describes the phenomena of enclaves and exclaves and tries to explain them. Then, based on this descriptive analysis, it tries to make predictions. Reality will put the theory to the test.

As a rule, static data for 2003 will be used. The dynamic data for various indicators will be used if needed. For historical cases, the data will be drawn from the end of the time of the enclaves' existence, for example, the 1996 data are used for Hong Kong as a reference, and 1998 data are used for Macau. Time series are extensively used in case studies.

The shortest distance is taken in measuring the distance between an enclave and its mainland. This does not represent a problem when an enclave is located close to the mainland. In such cases where an enclave lies far away, the distance to the closest point of the mainland is taken (and not to the capital city).

The data upon which the writer's analysis is based are comprehensive but not as complete as one might wish them to be (data tables are made available

at www.vinokurov.info/enclaves as supplementary materials to this book). This vast and underresearched field predetermines gaps in data. Its incompleteness often restricts one's options for qualitative instead of quantitative analysis. Case studies and benchmarking are used intensively. Quantitative calculations are made where possible.